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The Unsuitability of Emergence Theory for Pentecostal Theology: A Response to 
Bradnick and McCall  
 
Abstract 
In this response to David Bradnick’s and Bradford McCall’s defense of Amos Yong’s usage 
of emergence theory, we defend our previous argument regarding the tension between 
Yong’s Pentecostal commitments and the philosophical entailments of emergence theory. We 
clarify and extend our previous concerns in three ways. First, we explore the difficulties of 
construing divine action naturalistically (i.e. natural divine causation). Second, we clarify the 
problems of employing supervenience in theology. Third, we show why Bradnick’s and 
McCall’s advice to Yong to adopt weak emergence is theologically costly. In conclusion, it is 
suggested that theologians within the science and religion dialogue should not fear, but 
recover, the language of supernaturalism and dualism.  
 
Introduction 
Amos Yong has established himself as the face of Pentecostalism in the dialogue between 
science and religion. Yong’s main ambition is to undermine the often assumed Spirit-Nature 
dichotomy and to construct a Pentecostal theology which is consonant with the core tenets of 
21st century scientific culture.  In order to achieve this harmonization, Yong has turned to 
emergence theory. In our paper, “Science and Spirit: A Critical Examination of Amos Yong’s 
Pneumatological Theology of Emergence”, we applauded Yong as a “Pentecostal thinker 
who seeks to rationally examine the distinctively experiential elements of the Pentecostal 
worldview” (Leidenhag and Leidenhag 2015, 435). However, throughout that paper, we 
argued that emergence theory is an unsuitable ontology for Yong’s Pentecostal project and 
for Christian theology in general (see also Joanna Leidenhag 2016a, Mikael Leidenhag 
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2016b, and Mikael Leidenhag 2015). The main thrust of our critique was that emergence 
theory does not offer the kind of metaphysical resources that Yong seems to think it does. 
This overall problem was seen through three more specific critiques. 
 Our first argument addressed the theory of emergence directly. We argued that by 
“introducing supernatural causation into the natural order” (Leidenhag and Leidenhag 2015, 
429) Yong “renders the concept of emergence obsolete” (Leidenhag and Leidenhag 2015, 
425). This argument used the example of how Yong describes the Spirit of God breathing 
into ha’adam in order to turn dust into an enspirited human being.  Our second argument 
addressed the concept of supervenience, which is a central aspect of the (Clayton inspired) 
type of emergence theory that Yong employs. We argued that Yong’s claim that “God’s 
activity supervenes on human agency” (Yong 2012, 96) is deeply problematic. We also 
argued that Yong’s description of spiritual entities – such as angels, demons, and other spirits 
– as ontologically independent breaks any meaningful concept of supervenience theory. 
Lastly, we suggested that Yong’s project was too quick to transfer scientific concepts of 
hierarchy into the normative laden theological realm.  
 In their response to our paper, David Bradnick and Bradford McCall take issue with 
our first two critiques against Yong, regarding emergence and supervenience. They seek to 
defend Yong’s project by arguing that Yong’s concept of divine agency does not invite 
supernaturalism because “the Spirit works through natural processes” (Bradnick/McCall, 9). 
In section one of the following response, we take issue with the concept of divine natural 
causation, the idea that God can act in the world in a non-supernatural way. In section two, 
we extend our previous concerns regarding Yong’s use of supervenience theory within 
pneumatology. Here, we show why both weak and strong forms of supervenience threaten the 
agency, personhood, and divine reality of the Holy Spirit.  
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In our original paper we argued that Yong’s use of strong emergence faced serious 
problems.  Bradnick/McCall concede this point and urge Yong to consistently adopt weak 
emergence throughout his work (as Yong seems to do in some of his publications). In section 
three, we show that weak emergence is not a beneficial option for Yong, but only makes the 
problems we have already outlined more severe. It is for this reason that (in our original 
paper) we urged Yong, if he wishes to maintain some employment of emergence theory, to 
move in the opposite direction towards emergent dualism (Leidenhag and Leidenhag 2015, 
431-432). The conclusion of this response is that our original concerns regarding the 
incompatibility between emergence theory and Pentecostal theology still stand. It should be 
noted that our assessment of Yong’s work as supernaturalistic is not meant as a critique per 
se. Instead we encourage science-and-religion scholars who wish to maintain a realist belief 
in divine action to carefully think through, and not to fear, concepts of supernaturalism and 
dualism.  
 
Some Philosophical Issues for Natural Divine Causation 
In our article (Leidenhag and Leidenhag 2015) we raised critical questions pertaining to 
Yong’s attempt at framing divine action, and the Spirit’s activity, through contemporary 
emergence theory (as primarily articulated by Philip Clayton). For Yong, “Clayton’s 
emergence theory functions... as the mediating discourse bridging a Pentecostal reading of 
Scripture with empirical sciences” (Leidenhag and Leidenhag 2015, 427). In philosophy of 
mind, emergence theory has been praised for holding together the ontology and causal 
efficacy of the mental with that of the physical, thus avoiding a problematic dualism. In a 
similar way, Yong (through Clayton) seeks to apply emergence theory on matters of divine 
activity in order to dissolve the Spirit-Nature dichotomy. As is traditional in models of divine 
action, there is a parallel relationship being presupposed between how created minds interact 
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with matter, and how God interacts with(in) the universe.  Emergence theory seeks to 
articulate natural mental causation. A pneumatological reading (or accommodation) of 
emergence theory seeks to articulate, what might be called, natural divine causation 
(henceforth NDC). That is, a non-dualist, non-interventionist, and non-supernatural account 
of God’s activity and influence throughout the natural domain. Furthermore, NDC would 
entail an interactive and co-creative view of the relationship between God and natural/human 
creatures. In large part, Bradnick’s/McCall’s paper, through their critique of our paper and 
their extension of Yong’s pneumatology, seeks to further defend the possibility and 
coherency of NDC.  If Bradnick’s/McCall’s defense is successful, that is, if Yong’s account 
of NDC can be made coherent, this would be nothing short of a breakthrough for theologies 
of divine action and for the field of science and religion as a whole. However, any celebration 
is premature, as we will argue that NDC is not a coherent way to model divine action. We 
offer three possible ways to make sense of NDC, and show that each of these are unstable 
positions which collapse into alternatives which NDC claims to avoid.  
 
In our original paper (Leidenhag and Leidenhag 2015) on Yong, we argued that Yong’s 
account of the ha’adam (the creation of humanity) entails supernaturalism, despite Yong’s 
clear rejection of the term (as noted by Bradnick and McCall 2018, 10-11). This is because 
ha’adam only becomes a living being through the breath of the Lord. Unless one takes “the 
breath of the Lord” to be an instance of purely physical causation, Yong’s account seems to 
entail a form of supernaturalism (or dualist causation) which puts his theology in direct 
opposition to the monist commitment of emergence theory – that reality consists of one type 
of “stuff”. Whether the divine breath is effective in an instance, or over the course of billions 
of years, makes no difference to our argument (contra Bradnick and McCall 2018, 11).  
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Bradnick/McCall take issue with the label of supernaturalism or dualism, which we apply 
to Yong’s NDC. Throughout their paper, they argue in line with the NDC account that: “the 
Spirit works through natural processes” (Bradnick and McCall 2018, 9), that God produces 
events “through divine action within natural processes” (Bradnick and McCall 2018, 10),  
that “the human spirit arises from within nature and through the work of God” (Bradnick and 
McCall 2018, 12)1, that “God, operates within the laws of nature”, that we should understand 
“pneumatology as working within the framework of natural laws” (Bradnick and McCall 
2018, 14), that “God, who includes the Spirit, can act within the world through non-
supernatural means” (Bradnick and McCall 2018, 18), and that emergence theory is 
compatible with, or even the means by which, “the Spirit empowers creation from within” 
(Bradnick and McCall 2018, 24, 25-26). The phrase ‘from within’ here means that “there is 
no distinction between matter and Spirited-entities” (Bradnick and McCall 2018, 18). Despite 
the fact that Bradnick/McCall, in continuity with Yong, criticize Clayton’s “theological 
dualism” (Bradnick and McCall 2018, 7, 8, 20), all three scholars do not want to argue that 
God (or God’s Spirit) is natural; the identity of the Spirit remains supernatural (transcendent, 
Uncreated, etc.) and “‘wholly other’ than creation” (Bradnick and McCall 2018, 25). It is 
only the activity of God which Bradnick/McCall maintain entails no supernaturalism because 
God only acts within natural systems. It is claimed that a viable form of emergence theory 
offers a way beyond interventionism (Bradnick and McCall 2018, 25). With regard to the 
issue of ha’adam, the creation of humanity, they conclude that Yong’s pneumatology remains 
fully compatible with the monist and anti-dualist commitment of Clayton’s emergence 
theory. 
                                                          
1 This statement can clearly be read to a affirm supernaturalism or dualism since a distinction is implied 
between “from within nature” and “through the work of God”. Natural processes and God here appear to be 
two separate causes, both necessary to bring about the creation of a human spirit. However, in light of the 
other statements within Bradnick’s/McCall’s paper, it seems more likely that this statement is meant to imply 
that the work of God is within nature itself. It is this position that this paper argues against.  
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The commitment to NDC is common within the science-religion discourse, in particular 
with regards to areas of process theism, theistic naturalism, and panentheism (the latter is 
advocated by Bradnick/McCall in their final section). Prominent scholars, in a similar way to 
Yong and Bradnick/McCall, consider dualistic types of causation within nature and 
supernatural “intrusion” within the physical domain to be theologically and scientifically 
problematic. Thus, NDC presupposes that if God can act, accomplish particular purposes, 
such actions must be construed naturally and be rendered compatible with the physical 
regularities and laws of the universe. Divine action is not allowed, so many scholars have 
asserted, to upset the causal nexus or undermine causal closure. It is not just that “science 
models that very world in which God acts” (Bradnick and McCall 2018, 21), but NDC seems 
to imply that science can model the very acts of God.  Theories of NDC claim that there is 
“no qualitative or ontological difference between the regularity of natural law conceived as 
expressing the regular or repetitive operation of divine agency and the intentionality of 
special divine actions” (Clayton 2004, 84); “The processes revealed by the sciences are in 
themselves God acting as creator, and God is not to be found as some kind of additional 
influence or factor added on to the processes of the world God is creating” (Peacocke 2004, 
144). Hence, the natural processes studied by science should “be regarded as such as God’s 
creative action” (Peacocke 2004, 145), and “his activity is manifest in and through natural 
processes alone” (Johnston 2009, 119).2  
Needless to say, the notion of NDC has strong support in the science-religion community. 
However, can it successfully frame divine action? There are compelling reasons for doubting 
the philosophical plausibility of NDC, and so the overall coherency of Bradnick’s/McCall’s 
theological proposal.  
                                                          
2 It is important to note that Yong, however, rejects the view of natural laws as divine acts, and instead 
characterizes the regularities in nature as the “habitual” behaviour of created agents (Yong 2011, 129). This 
makes Yong’s view of natural divine causation more obtuse than Bradnick’s/McCall’s more clarifying depiction. 
In the final section of their paper, Bradnick/McCall encourage Yong to take the more panentheistic route here.  
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What Bradnick/McCall seem to say, and other scholars who adhere to NDC, is that a 
particular event, E, must be causally attributed to God’s influence, G, and natural causation, 
N. That is, G and N both (fully) explain E, as God only acts from within natural processes. 
Hence, supernaturalism can be avoided.3  
 At first glance, NDC seems to offer a neat solution to the problem of divine action, but it 
invites a host of philosophical issues.  First of all, it seems to encounter the infamous causal 
exclusion problem, as articulated by Jaegwon Kim against the possibility of strong 
emergence and downward causation. The exclusion principle states that “two or more 
complete and independent explanations of the same event or phenomenon cannot coexist” 
(Kim 1993, 250). A robust explanatory realism cannot posit two complete explanations, e1 
and e2, for one single event. Based on epistemic simplicity, we should say that either e1 or e2 
has to go. To ignore this problem would be, as Kim argues, to undermine causal realism as a 
whole, that “causality itself [is] an objective feature of reality” (Kim 1988, 229). Causal 
realism is a commitment of many in the field of science and religion, and giving it up would 
be a drastically high cost to pay. If Bradnick/McCall claim that G and N (in virtue of the 
close ontic connection between God and the natural) both sufficiently explain a particular 
event, then the idea of natural divine causation amounts to philosophical absurdity. 
If Bradnick/McCall do not mean that two causes sufficiently explain a single event, then 
perhaps they are claiming something else. They might claim that there is no ontological 
distinction between G and N. This is seen in several positions within the science-and-religion 
                                                          
3 For those well acquainted with theologies of divine action, this proposal might seem to be a version of 
Thomistic double-agency. However, double-agency states that God is a primary cause (accounting for 
existence) and the universe functions according to secondary causation (accounting for events and the pattern 
of cause-and-effect), in such a way that primary and secondary causation are two different types of causality 
working on two different levels. Yong’s and Bradnick’s/McCall’s project needs to reject this two-tier system of 
causation, because two separate levels of causation reinforces the dualism between divine action and natural 
causation, which NDC is trying to get away from. As such, the model of double-agency will not be further 
considered in this response. 
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dialogue which state that God is fully ‘natural’.4 On this view, it is not possible, not even in 
principle, to ontologically separate divine influence from the natural processes studied by 
science. Consequently, there would be no problem of causal exclusion, because this 
interpretation of NDC does not posit two separate and independent causes for one event. G 
and N, somehow, constitute each other; that is, God/divine causation and Nature/natural 
causation are mutually dependent upon one another for both their ontological existence and 
effectiveness. This is one possible way to interpret the NDC account. In Bradnick’s and 
McCall’s paper we find some sympathy for the claim that there is no difference between 
God’s activity in nature and the processes of the natural world; “there is no distinction 
between matter and Spirited-entities” (Bradnick and McCall 2018, 18). Additionally, they 
claim that a kenotic account of creation “eliminates a strict sense of theological dualism 
between God and nature, which means that nature is indeed enspirited from its very origin” 
(Bradnick and McCall 2018, 20).5 Given such kenotic relation between God and the physical, 
and the emphasis on immanence, perhaps one should negate any form of dualism between 
divine causation and natural causation? The danger with such a proposal, which 
Bradnick/McCall are aware of, is that the God-world relationship descends into pantheism. 
As they write, creation “possesses the Spirit of God from beginning, though one needs to be 
wary of falling into pantheism” (Bradnick and McCall 2018, 20).  Hence, to equate G and N 
is not a live option for those who affirm divine transcendence. To equate God’s activity with 
natural processes would mean that there would no longer be “any reason to interpret it [an 
                                                          
4 To be clear, discussion of God as natural is using the word natural neither in contrast to artificial (meaning 
fake or man-made), nor in contrast to unnatural (implying deficiency or undesirability). Here, the idea of God 
as ‘natural’ is strictly meant to contrast with God as supernatural. 
5 Kenosis is a Christological term taken from the hymn in Phil.2:7-11. In the case of the incarnation it seems 
that God does act as a created agent, whilst somehow remaining fully divine. Even in this case, however, 
traditional Christian theology argues that within the single person of Jesus Christ the divine-natural dualism 
remains in the two minds and two wills. To apply the self-emptying of the Son in the incarnation, to the Spirit, 
Father, or whole Trinity in a general model of divine action, not only seems to question the uniqueness of what 
God did in the incarnation, but also to invite a form of pantheism as further argued. As such, we are uncertain 




effect in the world] as an instance of divine action” (Clayton 2004, 193). By equating G and 
N one might be able to resolve the tension caused by the problem of causal/explanatory 
exclusion (the problem of positing two sufficient causes for one event), but it comes at the 
expense of making divine causation ontologically superfluous. We would no longer have any 
reason to appeal to theological explanations. In philosophical language, God becomes 
epiphenomenal.  
A third way of interpreting NDC is to say that G and N are “partial causes, being 
constituents in a single sufficient set of causal conditions” (Kim 1988, 234). Kim explains 
this idea in the following way: “we might explain why an automobile accident occurred by 
citing, say, the congested traffic, or the icy road, or the faulty breaks, or the driver’s 
inexperience, etc. depending on the explanatory context, even though each of these 
conditions played an essential role in causing the accident” (Kim 1993, 251). Hence, we do 
not have two complete explanations for one event, which would bring about the problem of 
causal exclusion. It is clear that two contributing, yet incomplete, causes for one event can 
coexist; in fact, this way of explaining events seems to be standard procedure in many human 
practices. Theologically speaking, we might say that an occurrence, say the creation of 
ha’adam, can be explained partially in terms of divine influence (the divine breath) and 
partially in terms of natural processes (the dust of the ground). G and N would offer 
complementary explanatory resources without one undermining the other. This is certainly 
the most promising way of understanding the interconnectedness between divine action and 
what science reveals regarding the physicality and ontological structure of reality. Indeed, 
Bradnick/McCall are open to the idea of “co-operation” between divine agency and human 
agency, which brings their proposal closer to Kim’s notion of partial causation: two distinct 
causes bringing about one event.  
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Could this idea of partial causation aid the NDC account and Bradnick’s/McCall’s 
construal of God’s interaction with nature? The answer, it seems, has to be no. Remember, 
NDC (as expressed by Bradnick/McCall and others) entails that God’s action must be 
construed anti-dualistically, non-supernaturalistically, and in a way that does not lead to 
interventionism. If G makes a causal contribution to E that is not reducible to N then N alone 
is insufficient for explaining E (in the same way as G alone would be insufficient). This 
would be an instance of partial causation from both divine action (G) and natural causation 
(N). Partial causation means that God and nature would be ontologically different and remain 
irreducible to each other (we explored above the problems of collapsing God and nature). The 
problem is that, given this ontological difference, we have a form of dualism within nature 
that is unacceptable to the supporters of NDC.  
This leads to a dilemma regarding how best to interpret NDC: a) NDC, as presently 
construed, leads to the problem of causal exclusion. b) NDC can avoid causal exclusion if 
interpreted as a form of pantheism. However, this turns natural causation or divine causation 
into an epiphenomenon. c) NDC can avoid causal exclusion and epiphenomenalism through 
the idea of partial causation, but d) partial causation is dualistic and so incompatible with 
NDC.  
To say that God only works through natural processes, or by calling divine causation 
“natural”, does not solve the causal problem that NDC faces. A non-dualistic and non-
supernaturalist account of divine action does not seem possible without sacrificing the 
transcendence of God and falling into a form of pantheism, or abandoning causal realism. If 
God makes a real difference in reality, if God’s acts transform, redeem, or perfect nature in 
any objective sense, then such an ontological contribution would go beyond the causal 
mechanisms of nature. Therefore, our argument that Yong’s portrayal of the creation of 
ha’adam invites supernaturalism and a dualistic causality still stands. If Bradnick/McCall 
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affirm divine-human co-operation more strongly (which we think they should), then this puts 
their proposal in direct opposition to NDC.  
 This depiction of Yong’s portrayal of Genesis 2 is not meant as a criticism. Dualism and 
supernaturalism do not mean that God goes against, violently abuses, or “breaks” the natural 
world and causal nexus; such terms are merely pejorative semantics which imply a distrust or 
suspicion of divine action (or the divine agent). Dualism and supernaturalism refer to the 
consequence of believing in an active (immanent) and transcendent Creator. When God acts 
with and amongst natural causes and agents, God’s action remains distinct and qualitatively 
different.  As such, we suggest that the language of theological dualism and supernaturalism 
need to be recovered and reinstated as healthy expressions of the Christian faith in the field of 
science and religion. 
 
The Spirit and Supervenience  
Yong’s account of the Spirit’s activity in nature and interaction with humanity relies heavily 
on the notion of supervenience; “the charismatic activity of the Spirit also proceeds from the 
‘top down’, and is somehow (as suggested by Peacocke) supervenient upon the activity of the 
free human agents.” (Yong 2011, 95); “In sum, I propose that God’s activity supervenes upon 
human agency” (Yong 2011, 96). However, supervenience is not a general term for causal 
co-operation between ontological levels; it is a term of ontological dependency of one kind 
on another (we explore this further below). This above quote, therefore, worryingly states that 
God’s action is dependent upon human action. In our article, we argued that this attempt at 
articulating the Spirit’s activity through supervenience is unsuccessful. We wrote that it is 
“difficult to comprehend what Yong means when he says that actions are supervening upon, 
hence constituted by, other actions” (Leidenhag and Leidenhag 2015, 431).  Moreover, there 
is a risk that employing supervenience within “pneumatology denies free independent agency 
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of the Spirit which is the key to the Pentecostal worldview” (Leidenhag and Leidenhag 2015, 
433). Supervenience seems a direct contradiction to the idea that the Spirit of God “blows 
where it wishes, and you hear its sound, but you do not know where it comes from or where it 
goes” (John 3:8, ESV).  
 Supervenience is a technical term that warrants clear definition. The thesis of 
supervenience is used for framing the relationship between higher-level properties and lower-
level properties: property Y (e.g. a mental property) is dependent on X (the brain structure). 
Supervenience highlights a relationship of dependency. To say that the mind supervenes is to 
say that the mental could not exist without the body or a particular brain structure. This also 
means that if there is a change with regard to Y, a mental property, there needs to be a 
corresponding change with regard to X, the physical. Weak supervenience states the minimal 
position that there is a level of dependency between higher and lower levels (See Clayton 
2004, 124; Kim 1993, 57-64; Haugeland 1982; Horgan, 1993). Yong himself accepts the 
definition that weak supervenience means that “the mind is dependent on but irreducible to 
the neurobiological processes of the brain-body” (Yong 2011, 148). To say that the Spirit’s 
activity weakly supervenes on human action means that the Spirit’s action could not occur 
without human action. Moreover, given that human activity is always imperfect and often 
sinful, claiming that the Spirit’s activity is constituted by human activity is to place into doubt 
the perfect moral nature of the Spirit’s agency.  
Strong supervenience maintains that lower levels determine higher levels, such that the 
physical would determine the mental, and that facts regarding the physical fix the facts 
regarding the mental domain. Again, Yong accepts this definition of strong supervenience as 
a form of determinism (Yong 2011, 148). Supervenience in a strong form would not merely 
claim that higher-level phenomena (the Holy Spirit, in this case) depends ontologically on the 
substrate level (human believers), but that the lower levels fix or determine the events or 
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phenomena at higher levels. The consequence of employing strong supervenience as a 
description of the relationship between human agency and the Spirit’s agency is to reduce, 
and thus make epiphenomenal, the agency of the Spirit. It is for this reason that Yong and 
Bradnick/McCall reject strong supervenience. Nevertheless, both weak and strong 
supervenience are in danger of giving the impression that the language of the Spirit is only an 
authoritative gloss on (sinful) human activity, since supervenience does not allow the Spirit to 
act independently of human actions.  
Given these problems with supervenience, perhaps Bradnick/McCall and Yong should 
articulate their emergentism without supervenience.  This is a fruitful option for Pentecostal 
theology, since without supervenience spiritual realities could be ontologically real and 
causally independent from their physical bases. We encourage Bradnick/McCall and Yong to 
adopt this position, but it should be noted that without supervenience emergentism amounts 
to dualism. If you remove supervenience then strong emergentism depicts different 
ontologies (minds and spirits), which despite originating from the physical, would not be 
grounded in or constituted by the physical. This is the thesis put forward by William Hasker 
in his emergent dualism (Hasker, 1999). Yong, in his discussion of angels and demons in The 
Spirit of Creation, comes very close to Hasker’s discussion of an “emergent individual” 
(Hasker 1999, 190). Emergent dualism, that is emergence without supervenience, was the 
position we suggested Yong should embrace in our original article (Leidenhag and Leidenhag 
2015, 431-432). The flip-side of this point is that if Yong and Bradnick/McCall wish to 
maintain their rejection of dualism then their use of emergence must include some form of 
supervenience as well. As noted above, dualism (and supernaturalism) is not a term which we 
believe theologians should fear or shun and our application of this terminology to Yong is not 




Is a “Less Robust Emergence” an Option?  
While they defend the overall consistency of Yong’s pneumatological emergentism, 
Bradnick/McCall do concede some of our objections concerning Yong’s theological 
application of emergence and supervenience. For example, Bradnick/McCall recognize that it 
is a genuine problem for Yong (Bradnick and McCall 2018, 18) to argue that strongly 
emergent realities (spirits, angels and demons) have ontological independence from their 
subvenient base structures, as this breaks supervenience (Leidenhag and Leidenhag  2015, 
425; Bradnick and McCall 2018, 15). They also write that Yong expresses weaker forms of 
emergence in other writings; “So Yong’s position is not entirely clear” on this point 
(Bradnick and McCall 2018, 18). Indeed, Bradnick’s and McCall’s solution to this 
philosophical tension is to adopt a “less robust form of emergence” (Bradnick and McCall 
2018, 15, 18, 19) and they recommend that Yong adopts weak emergence (Bradnick and 
McCall 2018, 18). However, their own position, articulated in their final section, loses clarity. 
Not only do Bradnick/McCall employ strong emergentists (such as, Philip Clayton, Arthur 
Peacocke, Denis Edwards) to articulate their weak emergentism, they also write that the Spirit 
enables “evolving entities to have their own autonomy and integrity” (Bradnick and McCall 
2018, 25, our italics) – a clear statement of strong emergence. 
We are pleased to see that Bradnick/McCall acknowledge these problems. Nevertheless, 
the move towards weak emergence creates more problems than it solves and threatens the 
theological adequacy of Yong’s project.  Here, we shall show why a less robust emergence is 
not a good option for Bradnick/McCall or Yong. Although it is beyond the scope of this 
paper, the implication is that weak emergence is not good for Christian theology in general.  
Let us rehearse the terms strong and weak emergence in order to address this problem. 
Someone who adopts strong emergence claims that an emergent entity, or 
property/phenomena, possesses some kind of feature that is ontologically different from its 
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parts. Whatever the amount of knowledge we have regarding the parts, it is epistemically 
impossible (practically and theoretically) to deduce the resulting emergent phenomena. What 
strong emergentists usually appeal to when they talk about ontological novelty is causal 
powers, whereby an entity can affect the course of events on lower levels (Silbersten and 
McGeever 1999, 186; Kim 1999). Strong emergence is an ontological doctrine “about how 
the phenomena of this world are organized into autonomous emergent levels...” (Kim 1999, 
5).  So, for strong emergence we find two key commitments: a) ontological irreducibility, and 
b) downward causation (irreducible causal powers).  
Weak emergentists, however, might “grant that different sorts of causal interactions may 
appear to dominate ‘higher’ levels of reality. But our inability to recognize in these emerging 
patters new manifestations of the same fundamental processes is due primarily to the 
currently limited state of our knowledge” (Clayton 2006, 8). This is an epistemic doctrine 
which continues in a more reductionist spirit: “weak emergent phenomena are ontologically 
dependent on and reducible to micro phenomena” (Bedau 2008, 160; see also Bedau 1997, 
375-399). Hence, “as new patterns emerge, the fundamental causal processes remain those of 
physics” (Clayton 2004, 9; also quoted in Bradnick McCall 2018, 5). Emergent properties, on 
this weaker version, become resultant properties, which means that they “are predictable 
from a system’s total microstructural property...” (Kim 1999, 7). Predictability here means 
that the lower-level determines the higher-level. That is, weak emergence goes along with 
strong supervenience, which (as argued above) is theologically problematic. Weak emergence 
posits no “new levels of reality”, and because it “places a stronger stress on the continuities 
between physics and subsequent levels, stands closer to the ‘unity of science’ perspective” 
(Clayton 2004, 10). This is definition is in line with Bradnick’s/McCall’s own description of 
weak emergence: “weak emergentists maintain that, as new patterns emerge, the causal 
processes remain those that are fundamental to physical” (Bradnick and McCall 2018, 5); 
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“weakly emergent properties are ‘novel’ only at the level of description” (Bradnick and 
McCall 2018, 5), and “weak emergence leaves us with the old dichotomy of physicalism and 
dualism” (Bradnick and McCall 2018, 6). It is clear that weak emergence paves way for, 
more or less, a reductionist conception of reality. If this is what Bradnick/McCall intend to 
base Yong’s theology on then it leads to severe complications.  
If a reductive relationship holds between E (a spiritual reality, angels or demons) and P (a 
base level of some kind; physical structure, human activity, etc.) then the causal contribution 
of E is already contained in P. On this picture, there would be no ontological/causal novelty 
and so the very reality of spiritual beings/realities would be threatened (this might be a 
comfort when it comes to demons, but not so much when it comes to angels). Given the 
reductive dimension to weak emergence, this would be neither a wise move on the part of 
Bradnick/McCall, nor a desirable outcome for Yong’s intention to articulate a realist 
Pentecostal worldview. 
We suspect, however, that Bradnick/McCall intend to articulate a position somewhere 
between weak emergence and strong emergence. Hence, less ontologically robust than strong 
emergence, which seems to break the commitment to supervenience and invite dualism, but 
not as ontologically nullifying as weak emergence, which seems too reductionist for an 
enchanted or spiritual worldview. What should we make of such a middle-position?  They 
seem to want to say that a particular spiritual reality is ontologically real – which supports 
strong emergence – but is not ontologically independent from its base structure, which brings 
this position closer to weak emergence. If this is what they propose then the following 
question arises: can we combine ontological realness with ontological dependency?  It would 
be very difficult to avoid causal reductionism if one takes ontological dependency seriously; 
that higher realities depend on lower realities and that lower realities are causally prior to and 
ontologically responsible for the existence of higher ones. As we argued above, if the causal 
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contribution of a spiritual reality is already contained in the base structure, then the agency of 
such spiritual reality would become epiphenomenal. However, if Bradnick/McCall claim that 
a spiritual reality, while depending ontologically on something else, brings something causal 
to the table that is not contained in the base structure then the relationship of supervenience is 
broken. In current context, if an angel or demon (or the Holy Spirit) makes a causal 
contribution which goes beyond the causation of the base structure, then the 
angel/demon/Spirit can no longer be considered supervenient. Remember that on 
supervenience higher-level events are derivative from and grounded in their subvenient level; 
hence the idea of a supervenient spiritual reality, a demon/angel, causally doing something 
over and above its base structure does not make sense.  
If Bradnick/McCall cannot coherently claim that spiritual realities are both causally 
efficacious and ontologically dependent on their base level, perhaps they should reject one of 
these claims. On their weak emergence they could simply reject the causal efficacy of higher-
level phenomena, including the notion of downward causation. Is such a move an option for 
Bradnick/McCall given their theological ambitions? No, such a move can hardly be seen as 
theologically adequate. To reject downward causation would mean that spiritual realities 
simply supervene on something, without being able to affect anything or contribute anything 
to reality. Yong’s “spirit-filled Pentecostal imagination”, to the contrary, stresses the active 
presence of angels in the lives of believers, manifested in “angelic deliverances, guidance, 
comfort and, justice” (Yong 2011, 175). Pentecostals “expect angelic interventions today, as 
extensions of the grace of God in their lives” (Yong 2011, 176). However, without causal 
efficacy of spirited entities and higher-level agency, such language would no longer be 
meaningful. Moreover, properties that lack causal powers, “would be of no interest to 
anyone; in fact, it was [Samuel] Alexander who equated the existence of an entity with its 
having causal powers, saying that an epiphenomena ‘might as well, and undoubtedly would 
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in time be abolished’” (Kim 2006, 557). Although Yong in some of his earlier work, as 
Bradnick/McCall note (Bradnick and McCall 2018, 18), writes that angels and demons are 
not “ontologically separate” (Yong 2003, 138), are not “Casper-like spirits floating about” 
(Yong 2003, 115) and have “no ontological reality of [their] own” (Yong 2010, 162), he 
consistently maintains that they are causally effective. Weak emergence is unable to support a 
realist stance on spiritual realities capable of acting in the world.   
Bradnick/McCall recognize the problems of strong emergence but their turn to weak 
emergence, in order to save the coherency of Yong’s Pentecostal theology, creates confusion 
and threatens to take theology down a reductionist path. In our paper on Yong, we therefore 
highlighted some alternative routes for Pentecostal theology and Yong’s theological project 
(Leidenhag and Leidenhag 2015, 431-432). 
 
Conclusion 
Bradnick’s/McCall’s attempt to defend and extend Yong’s use of emergence theory within 
Pentecostal theology, against the criticisms we previously brought against it, seems 
unsuccessful. We admire Yong’s ambition to bring a distinctively Pentecostal voice to the 
ongoing dialogue between science and Christian theology. This project, we hope, will 
continue and attract more Pentecostal scholars. However, we advise this important research 
area to move away from (monistic) emergence theory, language of supervenience, and 
naturalistic models of divine action.  
The first section of this paper dealt with, what we termed, natural divine causation. 
Hopefully the section on NDC is of interest to a wide range of theologians and scholars 
working in the field of science and religion. If God is a supernatural (transcendent, uncreated, 
etc.) being, can God’s action be natural, in the sense of being non-supernatural? We argued, 
negatively. Bradnick/McCall defend Yong’s theory of divine action by arguing that if God 
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can be seen to act within nature, then divine action does not need to be construed as 
supernaturalism. We explored three ways to understand the concept of God acting within 
nature. On first reading, Bradnick/McCall seem to suggest that there are two ontologically 
distinct agents (God and natural causation), each acting in a way sufficient to bring about a 
single event. This interpretation of their view invokes the causal exclusion problem, which 
threatens causal realism. The theological upshot of this is that this account of divine action 
seems to make divine action epiphenomenal. Second, Bradnick/McCall can avoid the 
exclusion problem by collapsing the ontological difference between divine and natural 
causation, but this invokes the threat of pantheism. The final way of interpreting natural 
divine causation that we offered is through a model of partial causation, whereby more than 
one agent or cause contribute to an event. Here we have two agents/causes leading to one 
combined outcome. We suggested that this is a perfectly acceptable way to understand divine 
action in the natural world. We suggested, however, that such a model entails 
supernaturalism. Supernaturalism states that God, a supernatural agent, gives creatures and 
nature causal capacities, and then subsequently interacts with those created agents in a way 
unlike anything in nature to bring about events in the natural world. Supernaturalism does not 
entail that God breaks, abuses, violates, and meddles with natural causation in a morally 
problematic way. We suggest that the re-appropriation of the language of supernaturalism 
would have far reaching benefits for the continuing engagement of theology with the natural 
sciences.  
The second section of this paper sought to clarity the language of supervenience. Again, 
beyond the current debate between ourselves, Yong and Bradnick/McCall, we hope that this 
clarity will be useful to general dialogue between theology and science. We argued that both 
weak supervenience, as an expression of dependency, and strong supervenience, as an 
expression of determinism, are deeply problematic when used to refer to the relationship 
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between the work of the Spirit and human action. If the Spirit’s actions are dependent on or 
determined by humans, then the perfection (and perfecting) work of the Spirit comes into 
question, as does the free and transcendent agency of the Spirit as a divine person. Although 
we do not think that it is Yong’s or Bradnick’s/McCall’s intention at all (!), we expressed the 
concern that if the meaning of supervenience is taken seriously, then the implication is that 
language pertaining to the Spirit is reduced to authoritative glosses on entirely human 
activities. Supervenience is a necessary clause for emergence theory, if emergence theories 
wish to avoid dualism. Since the problems of supervenience for theology appear severe, we 
recommend that theologians who wish to apply emergence theory replace Clayton’s monistic 
emergence theory with something like William Hasker’s emergent dualism.  
The third and final section of this paper assessed Bradnick’s/McCall’s advice to Yong to 
move towards (or to be more consistent in his use of) weak emergence theory. The move 
towards weak emergence successfully takes Yong’s project further away from the threat of 
dreaded dualism. However, we argued that the cost of this move is devastatingly high for 
Pentecostal theology. To articulate the reality of spiritual beings (human souls, angels, 
demons, and other spirits) through weak emergence is to say that such spirits have no causal 
powers and are fully determined by physical causation. Furthermore, if weak emergence 
(which usually goes along with strong supervenience) was to be applied to the God-world 
relation or to God’s action, this (as we saw in the second section) would make divine action 
entirely determined by human action and natural causation. If this route was taken, any hope 
that God’s action can counter-act human sin, and restore the universe to full relationship with 
God, seems lost. Again, if the choice is between dualism/supernaturalism and the 
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